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INTRODUCTION 
Home Rule grants cities the power to act without state authorization.1  It 
also provides them with protections from state interference.2  The scope of 
these powers and protections have long been unclear.3  But, given recent 
events, one might assume that a renewed debate over Home Rule is fast 
approaching.  Cities today are increasingly at the forefront of controversial 
policy disputes, addressing a host of issues from the minimum wage and paid 
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 1. See DALE KRANE, PLATON N. RIGOS & MELVIN B. HILL, HOME RULE IN AMERICA:  A 
FIFTY-STATE HANDBOOK 11-12 (2001). 
 2. See id. 
 3. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule:  A 
Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REV. 643 (1963). 
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family leave, to immigration and LGBT rights.4  At the same time, state 
governments seem more determined than ever to overturn these local efforts 
and limit the kinds of matters that cities can address.5  A similar set of 
circumstances sparked the Home Rule movement at the turn of the twentieth 
century, in which cities and their supporters fought for greater municipal 
independence from the yoke of state control.6  At the start of the twenty-first 
century, will Home Rule once again take center stage? 
Despite the growing interest in urban policymaking, there are few signs 
that Home Rule is making much of a comeback.  Indeed, if anything is 
striking about the contemporary state of Home Rule, it is how rarely it comes 
up at all.  Home Rule is widely ignored in popular media.  It is largely 
unfamiliar to the general public.  Even the cities themselves seem indifferent.  
As they widen their regulatory efforts in the face of state opposition, cities 
today are often reluctant to invoke Home Rule as a legal basis for their 
actions.  As they protest their mistreatment at the hands of states, few are 
framing their argument around Home Rule in their political appeals.  In many 
instances, it is actually the cities themselves that have weakened—either 
directly or indirectly—the Home Rule authority that they had once fought so 
hard to secure. 
Legal scholars have long complained that state courts and legislatures 
have undermined Home Rule and circumvented its protections.7  But have 
cities abandoned Home Rule as well?  Home Rule can be broadly conceived 
as both a bundle of legal rights and a set of political considerations.  Yet the 
legal structure of Home Rule also relies on cities to take the lead in shaping 
its role and development.  For Home Rule to be meaningful as a set of legal 
rights, those rights have to be consistently exercised and zealously defended.  
For Home Rule to be an effective political safeguard, its underlying values 
have to be vigorously articulated and regularly invoked.  There is no shortage 
of proposals today on how Home Rule might be revived, reclaimed, or 
reformed.8  But none of these are likely to succeed if cities remain on the 
sidelines. 
This essay examines the future of Home Rule.  Unlike other accounts, 
however, the focus here is on the part of the cities themselves.  The central 
claim is that cities are crucial in shaping the role and development of Home 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See infra notes and accompanying text 20-21, 23, 26-27, 34-36. 
 5. See infra notes and accompanying text 26-39. 
 6. See infra notes and accompanying text 61-64. 
 7. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT 
BUILDING WALLS 51 (2001); Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 
BYU L. REV. (2016). 
 8. See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 7; David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 2257 (2003). 
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Rule.  But the main concern is that cities today do not appear interested in 
doing so.  To be sure, sharp disagreements about the desirability of Home 
Rule persist, especially when it comes to local involvement in 
policymaking.9  Given its limitations, there may be good reasons why cities 
seem to be turning away, especially when alternative avenues to power are 
available.  But there are also consequences when cities fail to take Home 
Rule seriously.  These consequences extend well beyond Home Rule’s 
prospects; they also strike at the very heart of how we think about the role of 
cities in American policymaking. 
These arguments are set out in the following three Parts.  Part I focuses 
on the role of Home Rule in an era of municipal activism.  More specifically, 
it shows how recent city-state tensions over substantive policies raise serious 
questions about the standing of Home Rule today.  Part II examines the 
relationship that cities have with Home Rule.  While cities play an important 
role in shaping the legal and political development of Home Rule, thus far 
they do not seem deeply committed to this role.  Part II provides several 
explanations for why cities seem uninterested in Home Rule, and why this 
may be a troubling development.  Part III proposes some ways in which cities 
might—both individually and collectively—contribute to shaping the 
development of Home Rule.  These proposals are drawn from how advocates 
have shaped legal developments in other fields.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  WHY CITIES AND HOME RULE MATTER 
A. The Municipal Revolution and the Backlash Against It 
We are in the midst of an urban revolution.  Enthusiasm for federal 
policies dominated much of the twentieth century.  The “federalism revival” 
of the 1970s and 1980s shifted the balance towards states.10  As we begin the 
twenty-first century, however, there is growing interest in the role of cities.  
For generations, cities were viewed as the source of American’s most vexing 
challenges.  Today, however, they are increasingly cast as the solution to 
many of our nation’s most pressing problems.  On social and economic 
issues, cities are celebrated for their innovative and forward-thinking 
policies.11  In an era of gridlocked partisanship, local politics are hailed as a 
                                                                                                                 
 9. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local 
Government Law, COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1990); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and 
the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:  Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. 
L.J. 1985 (1999). 
 10. See generally TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: 
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM (2010). 
 11. See generally Richard Briffault, Home Rule and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & 
POL. 1 (2006); Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale 
and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014). 
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glimmer of hope amid America’s democratic dysfunctions.12  It may have 
once been common for policymakers to wonder whether cities were capable 
of governing themselves.  Now influential thinkers are openly asking 
whether it would be better if “mayors ruled the world.”13 
This enthusiasm tracks the tremendous turnaround that many cities are 
now experiencing.  Cities in the twentieth century were marked by 
depopulation, poverty, and fiscal distress.14   Today, many are staging a 
historic comeback.15  Interest in urban living is on the rise.16  Businesses are 
flocking back into the downtown core. 17   And housing shortages and 
gentrification have replaced abandonment and blight as cities’ central 
problems.18  To be sure, the scope and pace of this urban revival is uneven—
while Austin leads, Detroit lags.  But it is also more widespread than one 
may think.  Alongside the spectacular renaissance of major urban centers like 
New York City and San Francisco, rust-belt cities like Pittsburgh, Cleveland, 
and Buffalo are also showing signs of revitalization.19  If there is greater 
interest in the role of cities today, it is due in part to the fact that they are 
once again becoming the cultural, economic, and social centers of American 
society. 
Cities are not just doing better.  They are also doing more.  Although 
political gridlock stalls policy responses at the state and federal level, local 
policymakers, especially those in America’s big cities, have been filling the 
void.  On economic issues, cities have bolstered the push for the fifteen dollar 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See BRUCE KATZ & JENNIFER BRADLEY, THE METROPOLITAN REVOLUTION:  HOW 
CITIES AND METROS ARE FIXING OUR BROKEN POLITICS AND FRAGILE ECONOMY (2013). 
 13. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, 
RISING CITIES (2013). 
 14. See, e.g., JON C. TEAFORD, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN CITY:  PROBLEM, 
PROMISE, AND REALITY 130-53 (2016) (describing the plight of many of America’s great cities 
and the national sense of an “urban crisis” in America). 
 15. See generally ALAN EHRENHALT, THE GREAT INVERSION AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
AMERICAN CITY (2012). 
 16. See Emily Badger, Americans Are Paying More and More to Live in the Same Places 
They Once Abandoned, WASH. POST, Jun. 27, 2016; Conor Dougherty & Robbie Whelan, 
Cities Outpace Suburbs in Growth, WALL ST. J., Jun. 28, 2012, at A2. 
 17. See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Lure of Downtown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2016, at B1; 
Lauren Weber, Companies Say Goodbye to the ‘Burbs—Young Talent Wants to Live in 
Chicago Not Libertyville; Dilemma for Older Workers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304281004579222442197428538 
[https://perma.cc/4T84-BEJG]. 
 18. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, In Cramped and Costly Bay Area, Cries to Build, Baby, 
Build, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/business/economy/
san-francisco-housing-tech-boom-sf-barf.html [https://perma.cc/PZ2R-3EHY]. 
 19. See Susan Milligan, An Urban Revival in the Rust Belt, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 2, 2014) http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/02/an-urban-revival-in-the-
rust-belt [https://perma.cc/JK2K-4R5L]. 
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minimum wage and paid family leave, by adopting them as local policies.20  
On social issues, cities led the charge on same-sex marriage and continue to 
pave the way on protections for the LGBT community.21  On public health, 
cities paved the way for the prohibition of trans-fats and indoor smoking, 
policies only later embraced at the state or federal level.22  Even on global 
issues like immigration and climate change, cities are taking a stand. 
Immigration is hardly a traditional local issue, but cities are enacting a 
variety of policies regarding the settlement of immigrants and local 
involvement in immigration enforcement.23  Global carbon emissions are 
well beyond the ability of any one city to control, but cities across the world 
are building the framework for a coordinated response, while nations 
struggle to reach an accord.24  Cities may occupy the lowest rung in our 
federal system.  On a growing number of policy issues, however, they have 
taken the lead in framing the debate. 
The recent municipal activism is fueled by increasing demand from 
residents for their cities to do more, especially as representatives at the state 
and federal levels do less.25  But it is also prompting a backlash at the state 
level.  In recent years, states across the country have responded to municipal 
activism by passing laws specifically designed to block local regulations.  
These include preemption statutes that have struck down local laws that 
                                                                                                                 
 20. See generally Eric Morath, Cities Set to Take the Minimum-Wage Stage, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cities-set-to-take-minimum-wage-stage-14202
29294 [https://perma.cc/M6JD-UL36]; George Zornick, The Paid Sick Leave Battle Widens 
in the States, NATION, Mar. 8, 2013, https://www.thenation.com/article/paid-sick-leave-
battle-widens-states/ [https://perma.cc/GVG7-KWCZ]. 
 21. See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. REV. 955, 
957-58, 972 (2012). 
 22. See generally Raymen R. Assaf, Overview of Local, State, and National Government 
Legislation Restricting Trans Fats, 36 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 328 (2014); Charles R. 
Shipan & Craig Volden, Bottom-Up Federalism:  The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from 
U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825 (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1619, 1622 (2008). 
 24. See Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Governing of Climate Change, 35 ANN. REV. 
ENV’T. & RESOURCES 229, 231-34 (2010). 
 25. See, e.g., Andrew Ryan, On Range of Issues, Mayors Are Taking the Initiative, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 21, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/06/20/federal-authority-
last-century-big-city-mayors-are-new-power-centers/yyZlHolrjB8Dbpd6J2Yd1O/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/69TM-DZ8Y] (noting that cities felt more compelled in recent years to 
address urban issues that they feel state and federal governments are ignoring). 
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raised the minimum wage, 26  granted paid family leave, 27  or imposed 
residency requirements for certain municipal employees.28  States are also 
moving towards so-called “death star” legislation that block cities from 
regulating entire fields altogether.29  Pennsylvania, for example, enacted a 
law that prevents localities from imposing “duties, responsibilities, or 
requirements” upon any business.30  Similarly, Texas now forbids localities 
from regulating “fracking” operations, including through their traditional 
zoning powers.31  Further, states have become more punitive in their efforts 
to stifle local policymaking.  Pennsylvania and Florida not only forbid 
localities from regulating firearms, but specifically authorize individuals and 
organizations to sue cities and local leaders if they do so.32  Arizona recently 
enacted legislation that would withhold state funds from any city that 
regulates firearms, working conditions, or plastic shopping bags.33 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See Anna Louie Sussman, States, Cities Clash on Pay and Benefit Rules, WALL ST. J., 
May 31, 2016, at 1. See also Bill Kramer, Localities Challenging State Preemption Laws, 
MULTISTATE INSIDER, (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.multistate.com/insider/2016/08/
localities-challenging-state-preemption-laws/ [https://perma.cc/D2XN-NPNY] (reporting 
that twenty-one states have enacted laws preempting local minimum wage ordinances). 
 27. See Kramer, supra note 26, at 2 (reporting that fourteen states have enacted laws 
preempting local paid family leave policies). 
 28. See, e.g., Lima v. State, 122 Ohio St. 3d 155, 160 (2009) (upholding a state law that 
bans localities from requiring employees to live in any specific area of the state). 
 29. See Niraj Chokshi, Michigan May Soon End Local Control Over Minimum Wage, 
benefits and other labor issues, WASH. POST, (June 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/06/17/michigan-may-soon-end-local-control-over-minimum-
wage-benefits-and-other-labor-issues/ [https://perma.cc/68UX-GTWU] (describing 
preemptive legislation that is “so broad that opponents have taken to calling it the ‘Death Star’ 
bill.  ‘It would obliterate local control in Michigan, just as the Death Star obliterated Alderaan 
in Star Wars Episode IV,’ says East Lansing Mayor Nathan Triplett”). 
 30. See 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2962 (2016). 
 31. See Russell Gold, Texas Prohibits Local Fracking Bans, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2015, 
at 1. 
 32. See Fred Grimm, Florida Lawmakers Use Preemption Laws to Stomp Out Urban 
Initiatives, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 18, 2016, at 2; Chris Potter, Western Pennsylvania 
Governments Rethinking Their Gun-Control Ordinances, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 
22, 2014, at 1-2.  Florida’s law is codified at § 790.33, FLA. STAT. (2011).  Pennsylvania’s 
law, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6120 (2014), was recently struck down by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court for violating the state constitution’s “single-subject” rule, which forbid the 
legislature from addressing more than one subject in a single state bill. See Leach v. 
Commonwealth, 141 A.3d 426 (Pa. 2016).  A new bill addressing this defect has recently been 
introduced. See H.B. 2258, 2015 Leg. (Pa. 2015). 
 33. See Howard Fischer, Bill Would Withhold Funding to Cities That Ignore State Laws, 
TUCSON.COM (Feb. 17, 2016), http://tucson.com/news/local/bill-would-withhold-funding-to-
cities-that-ignore-state-laws/article_629dc636-b2b1-5cb7-8c82-979f98c9aefe.html 
[https://perma.cc/RBN4-6QJD].  The bill was enacted in March of 2016. See State Shared 
Revenues—Withholding—Investigations and Investigators, 2016 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 35 
(S.B. 1487). 
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Anti-local efforts also represent some of the most well publicized state 
laws in recent years.  North Carolina’s so-called “bathroom bill,” for 
example, prohibiting transgender individuals from using public bathrooms 
that correspond with their gender identity,34 was enacted at the start of 2016 
to a wave of national controversy.35  The impetus behind the law, however, 
was the City of Charlotte’s own bathroom ordinance, which granted them 
that right.  Indeed, not only did the state law overturn Charlotte’s ordinance, 
it went further by stripping localities of the power to expand 
antidiscrimination protection for anyone in the LGBT community. 36  
Similarly, when Arizona enacted its controversial immigration enforcement 
law in 2012, a national debate erupted over its encroachment on the federal 
government’s exclusive jurisdiction over immigration.37  But, as the original 
sponsor of the bill explained, the target of the law was actually Arizona cities 
like Phoenix, Tucson, and Flagstaff, which had enacted policies limiting the 
circumstances in which local law enforcement officials could participate in 
federal immigration enforcement.38  In both cases, the state representatives 
who voted for these laws argued that city officials forced their hand.39  As a 
result, their efforts were directed downwards in an effort to squelch 
municipal involvement in these issues. 
These controversies lay bare the growing tension between cities and 
states.  They also suggest the extent to which the traditional focus on the 
federal-state relationship is starting to give way to concerns about the city-
state divide.  But why are these fights becoming more common?  Why now? 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See David A. Graham, North Carolina Overturns LGBT-Discrimination Bans, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/north-caro
lina-lgbt-discrimination-transgender-bathrooms/475125/ [https://perma.cc/4NDN-NWMK]. 
 35. See id. See also Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016) (Charlotte’s anti-
discrimination ordinance). 
 36. See Restrooms and Toilets—Occupancy—Single Sex, 2016 N.C. Laws. 2nd Ex. Sess. 
S.L. 2016-3 (H.B. 2) (preempting Charlotte’s ordinance). 
 37. See Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2010, at A1. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051, amended by Immigration 
and Border Security, Providing for Conditional Enactment, 2010 Ariz. Legis. Serv. Ch. 211 
(H.B. 2162). 
 38. See Tim Steller, Sr. Reporter:  Sanctuary Cities in Arizona?, TUCSON.COM (July 29, 
2010), http://tucson.com/news/blogs/senor-reporter/sr-reporter-sanctuary-cities-in-arizona/ar
ticle_871e8cd8-9b3c-11df-81d9-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/7WMZ-JD6Y]; Beth 
Duckett, Scottsdale council members wouldn't take stand on SB 1070, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC 
(Aug. 15, 2010), http://archive.azcentral.com/community/scottsdale/articles/2010/08/15/
20100815arizona-immigration-law-scottsdale-council.html [https://perma.cc/67CE-6JHR] 
 39. See, e.g., Steller, supra note 38; Dan Boylan, House Speaker:  ‘The Biggest Regret I 
Have on House Bill 2 is Messaging,’ CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Sept. 8, 2016), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article100681517.html 
[https://perma.cc/L8FU-JGKX] (“When the Charlotte City Council ‘went down a radical 
path’ and passed its bathroom ordinance, it forced the state’s Republican leadership to react” 
(quoting North Carolina House Speaker Tim Moore)). 
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One explanation is partisanship.  Cities and states have long had their 
political differences.40  In recent years, however, that divide has widened 
dramatically.  Republican control of state governments is at its highest point 
in modern American history.  Republicans hold the majority in seventy of 
the nation’s ninety-nine legislative chambers, the governorship in thirty-one 
states, and control both the governor’s mansion and the legislature in twenty-
four states.41  At the same time, Democrats have expanded their power in 
cities, especially those in Republican-controlled states; among the thirty 
largest cities in America in 2014, all but four were under democratic 
control.42  It is no wonder, then, that the city-state divide today so closely 
mirrors longstanding policy divides between the two parties, including 
economic issues, immigration, and LGBT rights.  Nor is it surprising that 
national political leaders and organizations have turned their attention to 
state and local policymaking.  President Obama, for example, famously 
urged cities to pursue progressive policies after his efforts to do so at the 
federal level were repeatedly rebuffed by Congress.43  On the other side of 
the aisle, the American Legislative Exchange Council (“ALEC”), a 
conservative organization with an outsized role in state politics, has made 
restrictions on local policymaking a key part of its political agenda.44 
A second explanation for the increasing city-state conflict is a revived 
debate over longstanding questions about the role of centralized and 
decentralized governance in America’s federal system.45  On the one hand, 
supporters of local policymaking emphasize the pragmatism that guides city 
leaders, and their ability to tailor policies to the circumstances and needs of 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Gerald Gamm & Thad Kousser, No Strength in Numbers:  The Failure of Big-
City Bills in American State Legislatures, 1880-2000, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 664 (2013). 
 41. Herman Schwartz, One Party System: What Total Republican Control of a State 
Really Means, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/08/19/
one-party-system-what-total-republican-control-of-a-state-really-means/ 
[https://perma.cc/5XDX-9TEW]. See also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Michael D. Shear & Alan 
Blinder, In Obama Era, G.O.P. Bolsters Grip in the States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2015, at A1 
(“‘Republicans have more chambers today than they have ever had in the history of the party,’ 
said Tim Storey, an analyst at the National Conference of State Legislatures.  ‘So they are in 
a dominant and historic position of strength in the states.’”). 
 42. See Harold Meyerson, The Revolt of the Cities, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 22, 2014), 
http://prospect.org/article/revolt-cities [https://perma.cc/3CBX-M5N8].  The four cities with 
Republican mayors in 2014 were San Diego, Indianapolis, Fort Worth, and Oklahoma City. 
See id. 
 43. See Gregory Korte, To Get Around Congress, Obama Turns to City Halls, USA 
TODAY (May 26, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/25/obama-
state-and-local-strategy/27602149/ [https://perma.cc/2H6B-Q3ZX]. 
 44. See Mary Bottari, The ALEC-Backed War on Local Democracy, PR WATCH (Mar. 31, 
2015), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2015/03/12782/alec-backed-war-local-democracy 
[https://perma.cc/LK3M-A6RS]. 
 45. See, e.g., Michael Libonati, Home Rule:  An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 
51, 51-52 (1989). 
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their particular community. 46   What constitutes a living wage or the 
consequences of readily available firearms varies widely from one local 
community to the next.  On the other hand, advocates for state policymaking 
warn of the dangers of local policy patchworks, the insular perspective of 
local leaders, and the threat that unchecked local legislation poses to the 
sovereignty and interest of the state.47  They argue that uniform laws, enacted 
with general state welfare in mind, are almost always preferable, especially 
when it comes to controversial issues that divide the state.  Whether the 
underlying state and local laws actually reflect these values remains an open 
question.  Yet arguments about the respective advantages of centralized and 
decentralized policymaking are as much a part of the current city-state 
controversy as the partisan divide that fuels it. 
There is a certain irony, of course, that states now find themselves arguing 
against the same “localist” values that they so effectively used in attacking 
the expansion of federal authority.48  Yet it is also true, as many state leaders 
point out, that the legal standing of the state vis-à-vis the federal government 
differs in many important ways from the legal standing of the city in relation 
to the state.49  Understanding the city-state battles of today, then, requires an 
understanding of the legal landscape upon which they are fought. 
B. The Question of Legal Authority and the Rise of Home Rule 
Cities and states are increasingly at odds over substantive policies.  Their 
political conflict, however, also raises a legal question: what is each entity 
legally entitled to do?  Do cities have the authority to set, entirely on their 
own, economic policies like the minimum wage, or social policies like 
LGBT rights?  Can states unilaterally preempt local policies, or go so far as 
to prevent cities from regulating altogether?  The policies underlying these 
disputes may be new, but the legal questions that they raise are not.50  A 
century earlier, similar tensions sparked a national debate.51   From that 
emerged a political movement aimed at restructuring the basic legal 
                                                                                                                 
 46. See, e.g., KATZ & BRADLEY, supra note 12, at 6. 
 47. See, e.g., Josh Eidelson, Arizona Has a Plan to Get Revenge on Its Pro-Worker Cities, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-15/help-
workers-risk-losing-money-for-cops [https://perma.cc/5HA7-Z6WU]. 
 48. See David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L. J. 377, 
378-79 (2001) (describing and critiquing the use of localist arguments in favor of federalism 
and state rights). 
 49. See, e.g., Eidelson, supra note 47 (Arizona Senate President Andy Biggs stating that 
“[c]ities ‘think that they’re an independent and sovereign entity from the state, which is not 
true—they’re a creature of the state[.]’”). 
 50. See Kenneth E. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 269, 276 (1968). 
 51. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial 
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relationship between cities and their state.52  This movement, and the legal 
reforms that resulted, is what we now know as Home Rule.53  Given the 
parallels, it would seem that the development of Home Rule has a lot to tell 
us about the current fight over city policymaking today. 
Home Rule defines the basic legal standing of local governments and their 
relationship with the state. 54   To understand its significance, we must 
examine the legal rules which preceded it.  Traditionally, cities and other 
localities in American law were understood as “creatures” of the state.55  
Unlike individuals or corporations, they were thought to possess no inherent 
powers other than those given to them through state delegation.56   The 
translation of this legal concept into practice is captured by “Dillon’s 
Rule”—named after John Dillon, who penned one of the earliest treatises on 
municipal corporations.57  Under Dillon’s Rule, a city should not undertake 
actions, nor enact any regulations, without first securing enabling legislation 
from the state.  If ambiguity exists as to whether the state has given such 
authorization, Dillon’s Rule instructs courts to rule against the locality.58 
The purpose of Dillon’s Rule was to ensure that the state maintained a 
tight leash on municipal activities.  Not long after the rule gained widespread 
acceptance, however, criticism about the way state governments 
“interfer[ed] with the affairs of cities for political or sinister purposes” was 
already beginning to mount.59  Trust in the state, many urban commentators 
came to believe, was misplaced.  State officials, they argued, lacked 
knowledge over the unique challenges that cities faced, especially as 
urbanization and industrialization expanded their social and economic 
roles.60  Even worse, critics saw states’ frequent meddling in local affairs as 
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extravagant, inept, and corrupt.61  Cities wanted more power to respond to 
local problems and shape their future.  Effectuating this required an 
alternative structure for organizing the city-state relationship. 
Home Rule provided that alternative.  At the turn of the twentieth century, 
a coalition of academics, municipal leaders, and urban reformers rallied 
around a set of legal proposals to empower cities and free them from the 
excesses of state control. 62   They urged states to adopt—either through 
constitutional amendments or legislation—a set of reforms to these ends.63  
Advocates of Home Rule did not seek to overturn the underlying legal 
premise of Dillon’s Rule—they did not, for example, assert that cities 
possessed inherent powers independent of the state.  Yet Home Rule sought 
to rebalance the city-state relationship by tweaking how power and 
entitlements were allocated between the two.  If Dillon’s Rule held that cities 
drew all of their power from state delegation, Home Rule expanded that 
delegation to include nearly all the powers that the state could delegate with 
respect to local affairs.64  If Dillon’s Rule imagined that cities were creations 
of state law, Home Rule gave cities the power to draft their own charters and 
determine for themselves the powers they wished to exercise, the 
responsibilities they wished to assume, and the governmental structure 
within which they operated.65  And if Dillon’s Rule imagined that states 
might preempt local legislation, Home Rule imposed limits on the situations 
and contexts in which they could do so.  States were prohibited from enacting 
“special legislation” targeting a specific locality.66  In some cases, they were 
prohibited entirely from acting on “local matters” altogether.67 
Although changing the legal structure of the city-state relationship was 
central to the Home Rule movement, even more important were the kinds of 
cities that these reforms would make possible.  To be sure, there was no 
single vision of what cities might do with Home Rule. 68   While some 
imagined a dramatic expansion of city government, others desired a return 
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to a more limited form.69 While some saw the city as a vehicle for democratic 
expression, others thought it should govern through administrative 
expertise.70  Where there was agreement was that cities should be more than 
simply “mere legal functionaries of the state,” that they might themselves be 
“integral institutions in . . . efforts to reform government” more generally.71  
Moreover, given rapid urbanization and the new challenges this raised, 
proponents of Home Rule believed cities needed the flexibility to experiment 
with different approaches free from the restraint of state control.72  From this 
perspective, Home Rule was not simply a means of reallocating power from 
the state to the city.  Rather, it also serves as a framework through which 
cities could continuously renegotiate their relationship with the state.73 
It makes sense, then, that the legal changes were never thought to be 
sufficient on their own.  Equally important in the eyes of Home Rule 
reformers was the need for “an intelligent, well-directed home-rule spirit” in 
favor of local initiative—one that needed to be “awake[ned] in the state[s] to 
make [Home Rule] effective.”74  After all, the Home Rule movement never 
sought to free cities entirely from state control; local autonomy, in the purest 
sense, was never the goal.75  Yet reformers believed the legal restraints that 
Home Rule imposed, along with the political sentiment for local action that 
it would arouse, would limit state interference to only those instances where 
it was absolutely necessary and clearly justified.76  The law of Home Rule 
set the stage.  But it was the political standing of Home Rule, its framers 
imagined, that would determine its legacy. 
Home Rule proved immensely popular.77  By one count, all but six states 
had adopted Home Rule in some form.78  In some states, Home Rule was 
amended into the state constitution.79  In others, it was enacted by statute.80  
To be sure, the implementation of Home Rule varies from state to state.  
Moreover, these variations have become more pronounced as subsequent 
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amendments and judicial interpretations further refined its scope. 81  
Nevertheless, many of the basic features described above remain across the 
states that have embraced Home Rule. 
C. The Plight of Home Rule 
Home Rule expanded the legal power of cities and their political standing 
with the state.  Given its widespread adoption, one might assume that cities 
today have broad discretion to experiment with local policies and meaningful 
protections from state interference.  Yet as the response to the recent 
municipal activism illustrates, local policymaking is still largely seen as a 
novelty.  States continue to believe that they are entitled to block or overturn 
local laws, and micromanage the policy areas that cities and other localities 
can address. 82   In many ways, the manner in which today’s city-state 
conflicts are playing out do not differ all that much from the Dillon’s Rule 
era that gave rise to Home Rule in the first place.83  Why has so little 
changed? 
One reason is that Home Rule has proven to be an unreliable source for 
legal authority.  In many states that adopted it, courts have been reluctant to 
abandon Dillon’s Rule, continuing to defer to the will of the state.84  As a 
result, judicial interpretations of Home Rule tend to construe narrowly the 
types of issues that qualify as “local affairs” to be decided by cities, but 
construe broadly the powers that the states reserve for themselves.85  State 
legislatures have also been reluctant to recognize the limited independence 
that Home Rule granted localities.  They quickly found ways to circumvent 
the prohibition against “special” legislation by drafting “general” laws that 
in effect only apply to a single or small subset of localities.86  States have 
also urged an expansive view of what constitutes a “statewide concern” so 
as to further limit what would constitute a “local affair” under Home Rule.87  
This is not to say that Home Rule had no effect.  Yet the areas where Home 
Rule tended to be upheld were over issues like land-use that had traditionally 
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been subject to local control,88 and thus where Home Rule was least needed.  
As a result, the promise that Home Rule would usher in an era of municipal 
innovation, and offer cities a greater role in determining their future, never 
came to pass. 
But how about the Home Rule “spirit?”  Early proponents of Home Rule 
were optimistic that public support for local self-determination would serve 
as an enduring safeguard in state politics.89  One would strain, however, to 
see much of that spirit today.  There is little acknowledgement or awareness 
of Home Rule in public discourse.  Many urban scholars see Home Rule as 
ineffective and inconsequential.90  State legislatures have shown little regard 
for Home Rule as a reason to exercise self-restraint.91  And other than as a 
platform for securing policy changes at the state or federal level, few among 
the general public seem to know why city policymaking, especially on 
controversial matters, is worthwhile.  This is not to say that passion for local 
control is now entirely absent.  But in today’s political landscape, such 
sentiments tend to be associated with the concept of state rights rather than 
municipal Home Rule. 
The plight of Home Rule since its widespread adoption has led a small 
subset of legal scholars to argue for reforms.  The myriad possibilities that 
Home Rule imagined for cities in the twentieth century are still being 
explored in the twenty-first.  There are some who wish to see the original 
vision of Home Rule reclaimed, so that cities can address local issues that 
affect them and their neighbors.92  There are others who believe that the 
scope of Home Rule needs to be expanded beyond the limits of “local affairs” 
so that cities can deal with the host of national and global impacts on their 
communities.93  Many, like the original Home Rule proponents, believe that 
cities and their residents should have a larger voice in determining what any 
such reforms should entail.94  Others have argued that what is needed is 
clearer lines between spheres of state and local authority.95  Of course, not 
all legal scholars believe that Home Rule is worth saving; there are many 
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who believe that because the underlying premise of Home Rule, local self-
determination, was misguided, the doctrine should be reconsidered.96 
Despite the different views of Home Rule, most local government 
scholars believe that state courts and legislatures are primarily responsible 
for why Home Rule never lived up to its promise.  Cities, in their telling, are 
the victims, let down by states’ implementation of Home Rule, which 
deprived them of the powers that they fought so hard to secure.  But is this 
telling accurate?  Might cities bear some of the responsibility for Home 
Rule’s decline? 
II.  CITIES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO HOME RULE 
Much has been written on how Home Rule has shaped the role of the 
American city.  But little attention has been paid to the role of cities in 
shaping the legal and political development of Home Rule.  The fate of the 
American city and, more specifically, its participation in American 
policymaking, will likely depend on how and whether Home Rule is 
redefined for the twenty-first century.  Yet the role of Home Rule today, and 
its prospects for expansion or reform ultimately rests in the hands of the cities 
themselves.  In short, cities are not only the beneficiaries of Home Rule.  
They are also, its stewards. 
This Part outlines why cities are so important to the legal and political 
development of Home Rule.  It also assesses whether and how cities have 
carried out this responsibility.  Given the recent surge of municipal activity, 
it may be too early to conclude that cities have abandoned Home Rule, as the 
title of this essay suggests.  Yet there is also little to suggest that cities are 
committed to Home Rule’s long-term development.  On the legal front, cities 
are often reluctant to rely on claims of Home Rule, either as a justification 
for local legislation or as a defense against state efforts to overturn them.  On 
the political front, one would strain to hear Home Rule being raised as an 
argument for local authority or state restraint.  Indeed, in many cases, cities 
have been responsible for undermining the very powers and protections that 
they once fought to secure. 
It is hard to fault cities for taking this stance.  After all, as argued below, 
Home Rule has proven time and time again to be an unreliable source of 
power and protection.  It has developed over time an unfavorable reputation, 
especially with respect to cities, which undermines its political appeal.  
Moreover, cities have come to rely on alternative avenues to power—either 
by appealing to the state directly, or circumventing states in favor of support 
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from the federal government.  For most cities today, Home Rule is simply 
too costly and ineffective for supporting the actions that they wish to pursue. 
Yet the reluctance on the part of cities to take Home Rule seriously might 
be precisely why they so often find it ineffectual.  The failure on the part of 
cities to formulate a coherent legal theory of Home Rule, and their inability 
to advance a compelling vision of their role in American politics, might be 
why cities find their policymaking efforts so constrained.  Eschewing Home 
Rule may prove at times to be an effective short-term strategy.  But forgoing 
the use of Home Rule only makes it harder to justify why cities should be 
making major policy decisions in the first place. 
A. Stewards of Home Rule 
The future of the American city rests on Home Rule.  Yet the future of 
Home Rule also lies in the hands of the American city.  The reason for this 
relationship is rooted in the legal structure of Home Rule.  It is also a basic 
function of how rights and authority are defined through law and the political 
process. 
One reason cities are important to the legal and political development of 
Home Rule lies in how legal rights are realized in American law.  Legal 
rights are not self-actualizing: they exist only when claimed, they wither if 
not exercised, and they risk obsolescence as times change.  Civil rights 
legislation was on the books for nearly a century before concerted litigation 
efforts in the 1960s and 1970s finally transformed it into a meaningful 
bulwark against racial discrimination.97  States were thought to have faded 
into insignificance in the twentieth century until they collectively fought to 
resurrect constitutional federalism on the grounds of “state rights.”98  Federal 
laws against sex discrimination were narrowly construed until advocates 
successfully expanded their scope to cover sexual harassment,99 the handling 
of sexual assault allegations, and protections for the LGBT community.100  
In each of these cases, the “right” in question had long been secured.  Yet 
the standing and scope of these rights were only realized by repeated and 
often coordinated efforts on the part of those the rights were meant to protect. 
At the same time, the importance of cities is also part of the legal structure 
of Home Rule itself.  State courts may be responsible for defining the limits 
of Home Rule authority.  It is up to the cities, however, to act on the basis of 
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that authority, claim it in defending the legality of their actions, and advocate 
on behalf of a particular interpretation.101  Home Rule imposes limits on the 
ways that state officials can meddle in local affairs, and is supposed to reflect 
a state’s political commitment to local self-determination.  Yet local leaders 
are responsible for upholding the legal and political protections of Home 
Rule, by either challenging special legislation in court or advocating in favor 
of local control in the state house.  Home Rule sought to empower cities.  It 
also offered them some degree of protection from the state.  But more so than 
the local government structure that it replaced, Home Rule imposes the 
responsibility for defending and defining the scope of the right on the cities 
themselves. 
The special responsibility of cities with respect to Home Rule involves 
more than their efforts to adopt a particular local policy or resist a specific 
state mandate.  Like the development of legal rights more generally, this 
responsibility extends to the long-term development of Home Rule as well. 
This is because Home Rule establishes a uniform standard through which 
municipal powers are defined.  Under Dillon’s Rule, cities received specific 
delegations of power from the state, and because those delegations are often 
given solely to a particular city, state courts interpreted these delegations of 
power on a case-by-case basis.  Home Rule, however, purported to be a broad 
delegation of power to either all or broad categories of localities within a 
state.  As a result, the specific manner in which Home Rule is invoked, or 
whether it is invoked at all, sets a precedent for its future use.  This system 
rewards strategic use of Home Rule in ways that establish a coherent path 
for its development.  It also benefits from collective and coordinated action 
among Home Rule localities, as the success of one translates into gains for 
others.  Similar considerations led policy advocates of issues like same-sex 
marriage and racial desegregation to develop coordinated political and 
litigation strategies.102  
Cities are also critical to reforming or reimaging the current legal structure 
of Home Rule.  Cities played a central role in the initial adoption of Home 
Rule.  Their grievances established the groundwork for the political 
movement that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century. 103   Their 
aspirations shaped the basic structure of the Home Rule Amendments that 
many states adopted.104  More importantly, they mobilized popular support 
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for Home Rule by articulating a vision of what cities might do and what they 
might become.105  This is why one of the central components of Home Rule 
is the power for localities to design, amend, and frame their own municipal 
charters without state interference.  These are also the reasons why any 
successful political movement to modify the basic Home Rule structure will 
likely require cities to play a prominent part, if not take the lead altogether.  
Unless cities are willing and able to articulate why reforms to Home Rule 
are necessary, and what vision of the city would be possible as a result, it is 
unlikely that Home Rule, or any effort to alter it, would make its way into a 
state’s political agenda. 
In short, cities are not only the intended beneficiaries of Home Rule.  The 
very structure of Home Rule also imposes upon them the responsibility of 
safeguarding its role, guiding its jurisprudential development, and elevating 
its political standing.  The powers and protections of Home Rule are not self-
actualizing.  They are only as important as the cities believe them to be. 
B. Shunning Home Rule 
Cities bear much of the responsibility for shaping the legal and political 
development of Home Rule.  This Partassesses how cities have shouldered 
this responsibility.  To be sure, some cities are relying on Home Rule to enact 
local legislation and contest state efforts to constrain them.106  In this vein, 
the most recent wave of municipal activism shows some promise.  However, 
most cities remain uncommitted to taking an active role in shaping Home 
Rule’s legal and political development.  And even if more cities are 
becoming interested in what Home Rule can offer, its prospects are 
hampered by decades of municipal neglect.  But inaction is only part of the 
reason why Home Rule has withered in the hands of cities.  It is also a 
consequence of how local leaders have come to understand and perceive 
Home Rule in their day-to-day activities. 
1. Cities and the Law of Home Rule 
At the most basic level, Home Rule can be thought of as a bundle of rights.  
The right of cities to manage local affairs.  The right of cities to determine 
the role and structure of municipal governance.  The right of cities, as Delos 
Wilcox explained, “to do things.”107 
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But if Home Rule can be thought of as a bundle of rights, then its 
significance is tied to the manner and extent to which cities claim them.  It 
is only through its exercise that the boundaries of Home Rule can be tested 
and defined.  And it is only by litigating Home Rule that cities can shape its 
interpretation. 
Cities, however, are often reluctant to draw upon their Home Rule 
authority.  There are exceptions, of course, and these tend to draw the most 
attention.  But for every city that boldly exercises its Home Rule authority, 
there are many more less visible cases in which local leaders chose to refrain.  
While Seattle successfully passed a minimum wage ordinance without state 
authorization,108  cities like Cambridge and Boston tabled similar efforts 
because of concerns that it fell outside of their Home Rule authority.109  
Instead, they decided to lobby the state for authorization. 110  Similarly, 
Bloomington and Evansville joined a number of Indiana localities in 
expanding anti-discrimination protections to include members of the LGBT 
community.111  But concerns about their Home Rule authority also led them 
to limit enforcement to cases where the accused party voluntarily agrees to 
being investigated, essentially rendering the protections useless.112  Would 
these cities have prevailed if they had passed the legislation that they wanted, 
and relied entirely on their Home Rule authority to do so?  Hard to say.  But 
by refraining, a judicial interpretation was never rendered, and the true scope 
of their Home Rule authority was never defined. 
If cities are reluctant to invoke the powers granted to them by Home Rule, 
they are even more hesitant when it comes to its protections. Admittedly, 
courts have historically deferred to state efforts to block or mandate local 
policies, even though one of the primary goals of Home Rule was to limit 
state interference in local affairs.  Yet cities have also been averse to claiming 
these protections.  As such, the legal protections that Home Rule offers are 
rarely considered.  Take, for example, the fight over local involvement in 
immigration enforcement.  States passed a number of state laws penalizing 
or repealing local “sanctuary” policies that limit the ability of local law 
enforcement to participate in federal immigration enforcement.113  Many of 
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these state laws even mandate that law enforcement officials take particular 
actions irrespective of countervailing local policies. 114   Many cities 
protested; some even joined federal efforts to strike these laws down as 
unconstitutional.115  Yet despite the fact that Home Rule was enacted in part 
to prevent states from taking over municipal police departments—a popular 
move in the era of Dillon’s Rule—no city has challenged these laws on this 
particular ground.  Would cities prevail if they did so?  Again, hard to say.  
Yet what is telling is that such a challenge was never seriously considered, 
much less made.116 
Cities are also reluctant to revisit past interpretations of Home Rule once 
they have been handed down.  Of course, precedent matters a lot in American 
law.  But legal precedents can also be reversed, and policy advocates—on 
such issues as gun rights, abortion, and LGBT protections—frequently 
develop legal and political strategies with the aim of overturning unfavorable 
decisions.117  When it comes to Home Rule, however, cities seldom pursue 
such a strategy.  This is the case even when the precedent is particularly 
weak.  Take, for example, Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade, Inc. v. City 
of New York, in which New York’s high court struck down the city’s effort 
to enact one of the country’s first municipal minimum wage ordinance in 
1962.118  Despite the significance of its holding, the opinion itself was simply 
                                                                                                                 
REV. STAT. § 67.307(b)(2) (2009) (“Any municipality that enacts or adopts a sanctuary policy 
shall be ineligible for any moneys provided through grants administered by any state agency 
or department until the sanctuary policy is repealed or is no longer in effect.”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 36-80-23(c) (2009) (“Any local governing body that acts in violation of this Code 
section shall be subject to the withholding of state funding or state administered federal 
funding other than funds to provide services specified in subsection (d) of Code section 50-
36-1.”). 
 114. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2010). 
 115. See Brief for the Arizona Cities of Flagstaff, Tolleson, San Luis, and Somerton as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), 
(No. 10-16645), 2011 WL 5162523. See also Brief for the City of Tucson as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellee, United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011), (No. 10-16645), 
2010 WL 5162524. 
 116. Indeed, the closest argument that has been made was one by New York City against 
a federal anti-sanctuary policy, in which they asserted that the federal government was 
violating federalism principles by unconstitutionally “commandeering” the New York Police 
Department, which it claimed was a central operation of the state. 
 117. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY (2014) 
(describing the legal movement to overturn existing precedent on the second amendment right 
to bear arms, and its success in establishing it as an “individual right”). See also JAMES RISEN 
& JUDY L. THOMAS, WRATH OF ANGELS: THE AMERICAN ABORTION WAR (1998) (describing 
legal and political efforts to undermine abortion rights after Roe v. Wade). See also CRAIG A. 
RIMMERMAN, FROM IDENTITY TO POLITICS: THE LESBIAN AND GAY MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 45-81 (2002) (describing the legal strategies adopted by the LGBT movement to 
overturn precedent denying civil rights protections for the LGBT community). 
 118. Wholesale Laundry Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. City of New York, 234 N.Y.S.2d 862 (App. 
Div. 1962). 
2017] HAVE CITIES ABANDONED HOME RULE? 201 
a one-sentence affirmation of the lower court followed by two written 
dissents.119  The underlying rationale of the lower court’s opinion—that the 
city lacked the Home Rule authority to enact the prevailing wage law 
because it was in conflict with the state’s minimum wage, which, in the 
court’s opinion, operated as a floor and a ceiling—has since been called into 
question in a number of subsequent decisions.120  Moreover, cities in other 
states have prevailed on similar grounds since Wholesale Laundry was 
decided.121  Yet, despite some urging to do so,122 New York City has never 
seriously challenged this decision, even as its desire to address wages in the 
city remains strong. 
Perhaps this critique is too harsh.  After all, as noted earlier, Home Rule 
has not fared well under judicial scrutiny.123  And even when a plausible case 
can be made for challenging an unfavorable decision, there are often good 
reasons why a city may avoid doing so.  Legal challenges can hold up 
implementation, which may be problematic when what the city is trying to 
do is time-sensitive.  Litigation is also costly, in terms of both financial and 
political capital.  Even if a city is assured that it has the legal authority to 
enact a local regulation, it may fear that litigation would draw unwanted 
attention from the state.  States have the power to preempt local legislation. 
And once the attention of a state is drawn to a local policy that it disagrees 
with, the state can go beyond preemption and decide to strip localities of the 
power to regulate on the subject of that law entirely.124  
Even more important than the “push” factors that may have driven cities 
away from Home Rule, however, are the “pull” factors drawing them toward 
alternative means of achieving local objectives.  Since state legislatures and 
courts never truly renounced Dillon’s Rule, cities remain equally attracted to 
the certainty that the rule’s process provides.  Many cities still see securing 
explicit state authorization, or convincing the state to act directly, as the most 
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dependable way of implementing policy. 125   And if the state is not 
forthcoming, or passes legislation that frustrates the city’s interests, cities 
have learned that the best way to circumvent the state is to appeal to the 
federal government, rather than asserting their local authority.126  In this 
respect, the basic mechanism imagined by Dillon’s Rule continues to 
survive, even in states that have replaced it with Home Rule.  Greater federal 
involvement in local affairs opens up a new avenue for cities to achieve their 
goals. 
But there is evidence that cities do not always eschew Home Rule as a 
calculated choice.  Rather, cities sometimes do so because local leaders fail 
to understand what Home Rule enables them to do.  Many cities have 
internalized the limits of Home Rule to such an extent that they no longer 
see it as a basis for legal authority.  In some instances, they have come to 
perceive Home Rule as no more than a means of requesting state 
authorization.  Consider, for example, a report on Home Rule in 
Massachusetts based on interviews of municipal officials regarding their use 
and perception of Home Rule.127  While many local leaders professed pride 
in the state’s reputation as a strong Home Rule state, nearly all of them 
struggled to name an instance when they relied on Home Rule to act without 
specific state authorization.128   Even more troubling were the many local 
officials who, when asked generally about Home Rule, described it in terms 
of the “Home Rule Petition”—a Dillon’s Rule-like process through which 
localities can request special legislation from the state.129 
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Cities’ failure to take advantage of Home Rule stifles their legal 
development.  Even when cities invoke Home Rule to justify local action or 
defend against state interference, they often lack a clear view of how to guide 
judicial interpretations of Home Rule in the long run.  Cities may bristle at 
the ways states laws foreclose local action, or the narrow readings of Home 
Rule that state courts adopt, but they often accept these limitations without 
giving any thought to how they might be reversed.  The problem is that cities 
are not developing a clear idea of how they want Home Rule to operate.  Nor 
are cities advancing any substantive visions of what the role of cities should 
be in a Home Rule structure. 
2. Cities and the Politics of Home Rule 
Discussions of Home Rule today tend to focus on the legal powers and 
protections that it offers.  Yet early proponents of Home Rule never believed 
that the legal adoption of Home Rule was enough to ensure those powers and 
protections.  Equally important, in their view, was the need to instill a 
commitment to Home Rule as a “state of mind”130—one that would operate 
as a political safeguard in state politics.  The idea was that even when states 
are not legally barred from foreclosing local action, they might nevertheless 
refrain in the face of political pressure.131  
But if Home Rule depends on its “accept[ance] in spirit as well as in 
letter,”132 cities are poor evangelists for its cause.  They seldom raise Home 
Rule in their political appeals.  They rarely make the case that local self-
determination is meaningful in defending local legislation, or that local 
policy decisions should be entitled to deference.  At most, local leaders 
champion the substance of their policies that they are pursuing, and why they 
are superior to the state’s position.  What is missing is any effort to assert the 
values and principles of Home Rule itself. 
Consider, for example, how cities have reacted, in recent years, to state 
efforts to stifle local policymaking.  When local ordinances are blocked by 
state law, local leaders often speak out publicly against the state.  But in most 
cases, their focus is on the substantive impact of the state’s actions, rather 
than how it interferes with the substantive values of Home Rule. Thus, when 
the mayor of Charlotte condemned the state for enacting preemptive 
legislation against the city’s LGBT protections, she zeroed in on the 
discriminatory nature of the state law and the consequences it will have on 
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perceptions of the city and the state.133  She did not call any attention, 
however, to the broad powers that the state had already delegated to its cities, 
nor to the commitment to local control that the state’s delegation represented.  
Similarly, when Arizona mandated local participation in immigration 
enforcement, many local leaders raised concerns that the state mandate 
would undermine community policing efforts in immigrant neighborhoods 
and run afoul of the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over 
immigration.134  Aside from arguments that the state law amounted to an 
“unfunded mandate,”135 however, few local leaders criticized the law as an 
infringement on the spirit, if not the law, of Home Rule in Arizona. 
Even when states endorse local action on controversial issues, local 
leaders seem just as disinterested in bolstering the policymaking role of cities 
independent of the state.  Indeed, in New York, the state affirmed local 
efforts to raise the minimum wage and provide universal early childhood 
education, after Governor Cuomo made minimum wage and universal 
childhood education a priority in the 2014 legislative session.  However, 
many saw this measure as an effort to coopt New York Mayor de Blasio’s 
agenda and to prevent the city from acting on its own.136  Mayor de Blasio 
criticized the terms of the state’s plan and argued that his proposal, upon 
which he had campaigned, would be better for the city.137  But few, not even 
the Mayor, focused on New York’s status as a Home Rule state, and whether 
principles of Home Rule weighed in favor of the city taking the lead. 
The problem is not just that cities are not raising Home Rule in their 
political appeals.  It is also that they are not advancing a substantive vision 
of the city and why they should have control over their affairs.  Recall that 
one of the main goals of Home Rule was to create the legal space in which 
cities can decide their own organizational structure and what role city 
governments will play.  But cities today do not seem particularly interested 
in making a compelling case for why cities matter.  When they pursue a 
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particular policy, they are often active in making the case for why that policy 
is good for their community.  Sometimes, they go so far as to assert that the 
need for city action is because of inaction at the state and federal level.138  
But what is missing is any substantive vision of what kind of city is possible 
if they could make their own policies. 
Cities are not necessarily unjustified in eschewing Home Rule in their 
political appeals, because such appeals may be a political liability.  Since the 
idea of “local control” was used to resist the expansion of Civil Rights in the 
1960s, it has become associated with parochialism, small-mindedness, and 
outright bigotry.139  The Supreme Court further reinforced this association in 
the 1970s when it invoked “local autonomy” in striking down inter-district 
school desegregation and to justify inter-district school funding 
disparities.140  If early proponents of Home Rule believed that public support 
could be generated by drawing upon the appeal of local governance, events 
in the twentieth century greatly undermined perceptions of the local among 
the American public. 
On top of the negative political connotations of “local control” and “local 
autonomy,” Home Rule is also frequently portrayed as anti-city.141 Urban 
commentators place much of the blame for the troubles faced by cities—
white flight, urban decline, and fiscal distress—on the dominance of Home 
Rule.142  Sprawl, residential exclusion, and metropolitan fragmentation, they 
argue, are testaments to the undue potency of Home Rule, especially among 
suburban communities and over traditional local powers like land-use.143  
From this perspective, Home Rule is not associated with city empowerment.  
If anything, Home Rule highlights the horizontal competition between cities 
and suburbs, and the impossibility of developing a collective vision of Home 
Rule that will satisfy them all. 
Given the diminished political standing of Home Rule, and the draw of 
alternative avenues to power, it is not surprising that cities are reluctant to 
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invoke it in their political appeals.  In defending a particular local policy, 
especially from state interference, cities may be right to focus their 
arguments on the substantive merits rather than the value of local self-
determination.  Yet this calculus is also precisely why the Home Rule spirit 
that fueled the original movement has withered.  It is also why arguments in 
favor of one local policy rarely carry over to attempts by cities to address 
other issues at the local level.  If cities are increasingly at the political mercy 
of their states, it is in large part because they have failed to articulate why 
that should not be the case. 
3. Undermining Home Rule 
So far, this Article has surveyed examples where cities have refrained 
from invoking Home Rule in law and politics.  But neglect is only one way 
in which cities are abandoning Home Rule.  In many cases, cities also play 
an active role in undermining the powers and protections that Home Rule 
provides.  To be sure, these cases often involve situations where arguing 
against Home Rule leads to a desired outcome, at least in the short term. 
Moreover, they tend to revolve around bouts of intra-city conflict, in which 
different factions in a city are fighting for control.  Despite these purposes, 
this strategy establishes longstanding precedents that undermine Home Rule 
and its appeal as a basis for local authority. 
There is perhaps no city in which local leaders directly challenge their 
own Home Rule authority as frequently as New York City.  In recent years, 
a number of sensational fights between the mayor and the city council have 
resulted in litigation.  The mayor has sued the city council, alleging that a 
law enacted over his veto is preempted by state or federal law.144  The city 
council has sued the mayor, contesting his refusal to implement a law that 
they enacted.145  Many of these lawsuits turn on interpretations of the city’s 
charter, and the manner in which it allocates powers and responsibilities 
between the mayor and the council.146  But they also frequently raise issues 
concerning Home Rule, especially when the state or state laws are invoked 
as support for a particular side. 
Consider, for example, the battle over the prevailing wage law in Mayor 
of the City of New York v. Council of City of New York.147  In 2012, the city 
council enacted a law requiring certain employers tied to subsidies or leases 
with the city to pay their workers a “prevailing wage.”148  This law was one 
of the city’s many efforts to work around the prohibition of local municipal 
                                                                                                                 
 144. See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 780 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Gen. Term 2004). 
 145. See, e.g., Council of N.Y. v. Bloomberg, 846 N.E.2d 433, 436 (N.Y. 2006). 
 146. See, e.g., Mayor of N.Y. v. Council of N.Y., 874 N.E.2d 706 (N.Y. 2007). 
 147. No. 451369/12, 2013 WL 3989036 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 2, 2013). 
 148. See id. at *1.  The law at issue is Local Law No. 27 (1940) of City of New York. 
2017] HAVE CITIES ABANDONED HOME RULE? 207 
wage ordinances imposed by Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade, Inc. v. City 
of New York.149  However, the city enacted the law over the veto of Mayor 
Bloomberg, who feared that it would deter businesses from entering the 
city.150  The mayor challenged the law in state court, alleging that it was 
preempted by the state minimum wage law.151  In response, the city council 
argued that the law only applied to employers who chose to conduct business 
with the city, and was thus more akin to the contractual wage stipulations 
upheld in McMillen v. Browne.152  In the end, the mayor prevailed.153  But in 
finding for the mayor, the court adopted an expansive reading of Wholesale 
Laundry—one that applied not only to regulatory efforts by the city to raise 
the minimum wage, but also conditions imposed on businesses with which 
it had dealings.154  As a result, the decision not only overturned the local law 
before the court, but also limited the city’s ability to address wages going 
forward.  All this, of course, in order to settle an intra-city dispute.155 
An even more telling example of how local leaders have undermined 
Home Rule is the case of Greater New York Taxi Association v. State of New 
York.156  At issue was a state law authorizing the mayor of New York to issue 
18,000 livery cab licenses and sell an additional 2000 taxi medallions.157  
The state law thus only affected New York City, and transferred the city 
council’s traditional powers to the mayor.  The legal question was whether 
the state law was a “special legislation,” requiring the city council’s approval 
through a “Home Rule Message.”158  Again, the lawsuit involved a fight 
between the mayor and the city council—the state law was enacted at the 
behest of Mayor Bloomberg, who sought state authorization when the city 
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council rebuffed his efforts to enact it at the local level.159  But what started 
as an intra-city fight soon metastasized into a legal precedent with far-
reaching consequences for cities throughout New York.160  Despite finding 
that the law in question was “special legislation,” the court recognized an 
exception that made it easier for the state to successfully circumvent the 
protections of Home Rule and legislate on matters that affect only one city.161  
It did so by holding that “Home Rule Messages” are unnecessary if the state 
can establish that a “substantial state interest” was involved, and that this 
interest can be established merely on the basis of the “stated purpose and 
legislative history of the act in question.”162  The amicus brief from New 
York City’s corporation counsel urging this interpretation probably played 
one role in the court’s decision to adopt it.163  But it is ironic—or telling—
that the city played such a crucial role in establishing a precedent 
undermining Home Rule protections for all cities going forward. 
C. Reconsidering Home Rule 
The legal and political standing of Home Rule has waned.  Many of the 
reasons for this are tied to the behavior and perceptions of the cities 
themselves.  The next Part, suggests ways in which cities might retake the 
reins.  But before that, it is necessary to address some concerns that the 
foregoing analysis may have raised. 
First, even if we are concerned about municipal power, one might wonder 
whether Home Rule is necessary at all.  Cities are reluctant to rely on Home 
Rule as a basis for their legal authority.  Yet that does not mean that cities 
are entirely powerless when it comes to advancing local objectives.  States 
often delegate the legal powers that cities request. 164   The federal 
government frequently supplies financial resources and manpower when 
state support is lacking.165  And many local concerns end up being addressed 
by state or federal law.  Does it matter if cities cannot act on their own if they 
can instead influence state or federal policies? 
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Cities are not powerless in contemporary law and politics.  But it is 
important to recognize that the soft influence wielded by cities is, at best, an 
imperfect substitute for the legal entitlements and political power that Home 
Rule promised.  There are many practical reasons why cities might need the 
power to take initiative on issues that have failed to attract state or national 
attention, or the flexibility to experiment with different policies at a local 
scale before they are implemented more broadly.  Even more important is 
the sense of agency that Home Rule provides to cities and their residents.  
Seeking permission is different from the power to act.  Selecting 
representatives to lobby is different from electing them to make policy.  
There is growing concern among Americans today that the government is 
increasingly disconnected from the people it represents.  Yet if the 
government that is closest to the people lacks the power to respond to and 
act on their demands, it is difficult to see how that sentiment can be reversed. 
While some wonder if Home Rule is necessary, others might ask whether 
Home Rule is enough to advance local policymaking.  Even if one is 
sympathetic to the vision set forth by Home Rule’s framers, there is still the 
question of whether the legal and political framework that they settled on 
actually makes that vision possible.  As history has shown, Home Rule has 
been particularly vulnerable to narrow readings by state courts, and creative 
circumvention by state legislatures.  Despite the many arguments raised on 
behalf of Home Rule in the past, its stature has diminished in the heart and 
imagination of the general public.  Perhaps a new municipal revolution is 
necessary—a different vision of local power for changing times. 
For any reforms to be effective, cities will have to be actively involved.  
Without cities defending the legal scope of Home Rule and raising its 
political profile, it is difficult to imagine public support for a more 
meaningful expansion.  Nor can a better vision of municipal power be 
designed without understanding why cities are so reluctant to rely on the 
Home Rule authority that many of them currently possess. 
At the same time, maybe the existing structure of Home Rule is not as 
problematic as it may seem.  The vague standards that it employs certainly 
create a lot of uncertainty—over what constitutes a “local affair” or what 
qualifies as a “special legislation.”166  Yet such standards make Home Rule 
adaptable to changing times, and flexible enough to allow municipal 
innovations to flourish.167  Home Rule, after all, was never intended to be a 
static list of municipal powers and state restrictions.  It was always imagined 
to be a framework in which the role of cities, and their relationship with the 
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state, can be continuously renegotiated in services of a number of different 
ends.168  Even if we can agree on a sphere of local authority and insulate it 
from state interference, as some have suggested,169 that sphere will probably 
need to be revisited from time to time.  The current structure of Home Rule 
does not eliminate that negotiation.  It simply requires the city to play its 
part. 
At this point, one may wonder whether too much is required of cities.  
Should cities be the ones to steward the legal and political development of 
Home Rule?  And even if they should, are they capable of doing so?  The 
original Home Rule movement’s optimism about cities and their role with 
respect to Home Rule may have been overly optimistic.  Perhaps cities are 
simply not suited to the legal and political maneuvering that Home Rule 
requires of them. 
It is easy enough to respond with a list of what cities have accomplished, 
and how that demonstrates their capacity to negotiate the legal and political 
landscape on behalf of Home Rule.  Home Rule is important to the legal and 
political standing of cities, and recognizing that might incentivize cities to 
play a more significant role.  But the truth is that, in the end, cities will have 
the kind of Home Rule that they deserve.  Showing that they are capable and 
willing to advance a substantive vision of their role in American governance, 
and advocating a vision of Home Rule that gets them there, is tied to the 
broader question of whether cities are entitled to Home Rule at all. 
III.  HOW CITIES MIGHT SHAPE HOME RULE 
Although Home Rule is important to the fate of the American city, cities 
thus far seem uncommitted to shaping their legal and political development.  
But what would such a commitment look like?  How would it differ from 
what cities are already doing?    The goal in this Part is not to advance any 
particular vision of Home Rule.  This is something that cities need to decide 
for themselves.  Yet there are some steps—with respect to litigation strategy, 
political mobilization, and interlocal collaboration—that cities must take for 
Home Rule to serve as a vehicle for rethinking their role for the twenty-first 
century. 
A. Legal Push and Litigation Strategy 
First, cities should be more willing to invoke the legal powers of Home 
Rule to justify their action.  They should do so not only when their actions 
fall squarely within Home Rule, but also in cases where their Home Rule 
authority to act is unclear.  In addition, cities should invoke Home Rule to 
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shield themselves from state interference, especially when the state seeks to 
circumvent legal barriers erected for their protection.  As noted earlier, 
because the powers and protections that Home Rule affords are inherently 
unclear,170 courts are often the only place where their scope is defined.  As 
such, a willingness to assert Home Rule as a legal claim, and litigate its 
meaning before a state court, is the only way to clarify the outer limits of 
Home Rule’s powers and protections. 
But cities should not litigate Home Rule in a haphazard manner, or even 
anytime a plausible claim should be made.  Rather they should proceed with 
a clear vision of how they would like to see Home Rule develop.  Doing so 
will likely involve a certain degree of soul-searching, because cities will need 
to define the role they would like to play in policymaking, and the interests 
of their communities going forward.  It will also require cities to connect 
their visions of their roles with the legal powers and protections necessary to 
realize them. 
Developing a substantive vision of their city—a “city future,” if you 
will171—is central to understanding what kind of Home Rule structure might 
be desirable.  But equally important is crafting a litigation strategy that will 
achieve this vision.  As civil rights advocates have long recognized, seminal 
judicial successes are rarely won in a vacuum.  They are often built on a 
number of smaller victories that establish the necessary precedent and build 
momentum towards the desired outcome.172  Laying the proper foundation 
requires careful planning with respect to what kinds of issues should be 
presented before a court and in what order, along with the types of cases that 
will best serve as the vehicle for raising those issues. Sometimes the ideal 
test case materializes naturally.  Other times, they may need to be 
manufactured. 
A legal approach to Home Rule like the one described above is certainly 
more involved than mayors or municipal legal departments are used to.  It 
requires a willingness to fight legal battles not only for immediate gain, but 
also in the interest of returns down the road.  It is an approach that revolves 
around defining long-term goals, not only with respect to a vision for the 
city, but also a litigation strategy to get it there.  Local leaders often have the 
best interests of their cities at heart.  But, as shown above, they often do not 
have the wherewithal or the foresight to see litigation, especially litigation 
on the basis of Home Rule, as a path towards fulfilling those interests.173 
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B. Political Mobilization 
Although litigation strategies are important, cities must also take an active 
role in shaping their political standing outside of the courtroom.  A city’s 
commitment to Home Rule extends beyond shaping the legal claims that 
Home Rule offers.  In some cases, this may involve taking control of how 
Home Rule is understood and portrayed in the political arena.  In other cases, 
it may require cities to lead political movements aimed at reforming Home 
Rule in states that have it, or adopting it in states that do not.  Political 
mobilization proved critical to the initial rise of Home Rule.174  It makes 
sense that the political standing of Home Rule remains important to its 
future. 
Home Rule’s political standing is particularly important at the state level.  
The fact is, no matter how expansive Home Rule is defined, it will never 
insulate cities entirely from state interference.  Nor should it.  But whether 
or how states respond to local efforts to enact substantive policies also 
depends on how state leaders perceive the role of local governments in their 
state.  From this perspective, Home Rule is more than just a set of legal 
entitlements that allows cities to push back against their states.  It is also a 
political outlook on the role of cities and other localities in American 
governance—one that might sway how states interact with their localities.  
Of course, this requires Home Rule to attain a kind of political salience in 
the state political process that currently seems to be lacking. 
Elevating the political standing of Home Rule in state politics is no simple 
task.  But the states’ own struggle against federal power, and their successful 
effort in bolstering federalism in American law and politics, offers a guide.  
In many ways, the political standing of states in our federal system rests on 
constitutional language that is just as vague as language regarding cities 
under Home Rule.175  Moreover, in the mid-twentieth century, the very 
concept of “state rights” was similarly tarred by its association with Jim 
Crow and state resistance to desegregation.176  Therefore, many questioned 
whether states still mattered as the scope of federal policymaking 
expanded.177  Yet persistent advocacy by states, accompanied by strategic 
litigation efforts, forced the federal government to take seriously the interest 
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of states in the design of federal programs and the implementation of federal 
law.178 
Cities might similarly reorient the culture of state politics.  To be sure, the 
mantra of “state rights” has considerably more political salience than 
“municipal rights” today, even though the values associated with the two are 
similar.  The partisan divide that now separates many cities from their state 
also seems insurmountable, especially as cities seek to address local issues 
that are also national controversies.179  Yet early proponents of Home Rule 
were convinced that cities could prevail if they could rally the general public 
to their cause, and unify cities behind a common vision of municipal 
power.180  After all, the state legislature is in many ways simply a collective 
of local delegations.  And it may be possible that state courts would be more 
inclined to side with cities if they believed popular support of Home Rule 
was growing.  But all of this requires cities and other localities to raise the 
values of Home Rule as a political consideration, and craft a political 
message that would resonate with the general public. 
C. Concerted Effort 
Developing a litigation and political strategy for Home Rule is a daunting 
task for even the most well-resourced cities, but cities need not go at this task 
alone.  Indeed, any meaningful effort in bolstering Home Rule will likely 
require a collective vision and coordinated action. 
This Article has focused on Home Rule from the perspective of the 
vertical tensions between cities and states.  But the lack of collective action 
among localities is also a major reason for Home Rule’s decline.  The 
problem is that cities and other local communities tend to see themselves 
enmeshed in a zero-sum game.  They compete for residents and development 
opportunities.  They jostle for businesses and the tax revenues that they 
bring.  They are jealous of one another and, when collaborative opportunities 
present themselves, fear exploitation at each other’s hands.181  As a result, 
localities are often reluctant to enter into inter-local agreements even when 
permitted by state law.182  This competition also explains why they often find 
themselves on opposite sides of controversial policy debates. 
Although local leaders struggle to find common ground on substantive 
policies, they might be able to reach consensus over whether Home Rule is 
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worth supporting, and if so, how to implement it.  As James Gardner and 
Antoni Ninet argue, this was precisely the common ground that the American 
states were able to reach in defending federalism and state power from 
federal encroachment.183  Comparing the stability of the federal system in 
the U.S. to the collapse of such an arrangement in Spain, they attribute the 
U.S.’ success to the degree to which American states were willing to set aside 
their differences in key battles and compete collectively—through litigation 
and political lobbying—against the federal government.184 
Early proponents of Home Rule believed that this kind of collaboration 
was necessary to ensure Home Rule’s future.  As one advocate colorfully 
explained: if all the cities in a state “have a common interest in an identical 
list of powers, conferred upon them by the legislature, the legislature cannot 
invade that pool of powers except over our dead bodies.”185  In states that 
have embraced Home Rule, there is no better way to shape its development 
than through the joint commitment of all its cities and localities.  And in 
states that have yet to adopt Home Rule, there is no better way to push them 
to follow suit than through the joint advocacy of local leaders. 
Collective action on Home Rule, however, need not be limited to cities 
and localities within a given state.  It is also possible to imagine fruitful 
collaboration across state lines.  Despite the subtle variations that exist from 
state to state, a common language and structure unites Home Rule provisions 
across the country.186  Therefore, while no state court is bound to follow the 
interpretation of another state, judges often refer to out-of-state cases in 
rendering their own decisions on various provisions of Home Rule.187  Cities 
should use this practice to their advantage, coordinating litigation strategies 
to encourage victories in jurisdictions amenable to a favorable interpretation 
to cascade from state to state.  Coordinating efforts in this manner will not 
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only increase the likelihood that a particular vision of Home Rule 
disseminates, but will generate publicity and create political momentum. 
Although the most difficult part of collective action is coordinating 
interested parties, platforms for inter-local collaboration already exist.  
“Leagues” of cities,188 “associations” of counties,189 and “conferences” of 
mayors190 have been founded both nationally and as separate organizations 
in many states.  And they all have been central to coordinating actions among 
their members.  These organizations have traditionally focused on political 
lobbying,191 and in recent years, on securing specific policies or grants at the 
state or federal level.192  But they might once again serve as vehicles for 
Home Rule.  The precursors to many of these organizations were 
instrumental to the movement that turned Home Rule into the dominant local 
government structure at the turn of the twentieth century.193  It was also the 
concerted effort by the American Municipal Association that advocated for 
the most recent reconsideration of Home Rule in the 1950s and 1960s.194 
Home Rule need not be a force for fragmentation and balkanization, as 
many local government scholars fear.195  Indeed, for Home Rule to survive, 
cities need to tap into the collective spirit that once united them a century 
earlier. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the state of American politics, cities will likely continue to play a 
major role in a number of policy disputes going forward.  What that role 
might be will depend on the legal and political development of Home Rule.  
There are already a number of proposals for how Home Rule might be 
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reformed.196  But the prospect for these reforms depends largely on the 
actions of the cities themselves.  Will cities take the lead in shaping the future 
of Home Rule and, in turn, the role of cities in the twenty-first century?  Or 
will Home Rule, and efforts to reform it, wither as cities look elsewhere for 
the power and authority to act? 
As financial advisors are fond of pointing out, past performance is no 
guarantee of future results.  Yet if recent history is any guide, the prospects 
for Home Rule are bleak.  Cities are not playing an active role in shaping 
Home Rule’s jurisprudential and political development.  Even more 
troubling are signs that cities are turning away from Home Rule altogether. 
On the legal front, cities are often reluctant to rely on claims of Home Rule, 
either as a justification for local legislation or as a defense against state 
efforts to overturn them.  On the political front, one would strain to hear 
Home Rule being raised as an argument for local autonomy or state restraint.  
Indeed, in many cases, cities are actively undermining the very powers and 
protections that they once fought to secure. 
But cities need not accept the existing structure of Home Rule, or how it 
is currently implemented.  Cities can take control of the Home Rule authority 
that they have been given, through law and politics.  Cities should decide for 
themselves what kind of city they would like to be, and work collectively to 
realize a Home Rule structure that will get them there.  It may be too early 
to conclude that cities have abandoned Home Rule.  Yet it is not too late for 
cities to reclaim it. 
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